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United Nations Peacekeeping:
Development and Prospects
I. The Circumstances in which Peacekeeping Operations Were Created
It is necessary to understand the nature and decision-making process of
the United Nations in order to appreciate the issues involved in today's
U.N. peacekeeping operations.
The United Nations is a political institution and an inter-governmen-
tal organization composed of 185 sovereign states, and its competence is
governed by the U.N. Charter. Only Member States are competent to
make proposals, and the Organization can only act in pursuance of deci-
sions which are collectively taken by those states.
The Security Council is principally responsible for carrying out the
Organization's fundamental objective of maintaining international peace
and security. However, neither the Security Council nor any other organs
have the power to impose their decisions on the Member States.' The
only exception occurs when the Council decides to act under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, in which case the decisions are binding and enforcea-
ble in the territories of Member States.
Chapter VII of the Charter provides for a collective security system
under which the Security Council is empowered to take a range of meas-
ures when international peace and security is endangered. For example,
the Council may require the parties concerned to comply with provisional
measures that it deems necessary,2 order complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and means of communication, and/or sever diplo-
matic relations. 3 In addition, the Council has the power to apply air, sea,
or land forces, which ideally would be under the command of the Military
Staff Committee composed of the representatives of the five permanent
members of the Council. 4 The Charter envisioned an arrangement
whereby States would make their forces available by concluding agree-
ments with the Security Council. However, thus far such arrangements
under these Articles have not taken place.
* Principal Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, U.N. Secretariat, United
Nations. McGill University, LL.M., University of London, Ph.D. This paper is
submitted by the author in his personal capacity and does not necessarily represent the
views of the institution of which he is a member.
1. This does not include decisions pertaining to matters concerning finance and
administration of the Organization.
2. U.N. CHARTER, art. 40.
3. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
4. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 42, 45-47.
28 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 619 (1995)
Cornell International Law Journal
Decisions under Chapter VII are substantive in nature, requiring a
majority of at least nine votes (out of a total of fifteen); this majority must
include the "concurring" votes of the five permanent members. Accord-
ing to the Provisional Rules of the Council, even though absence and
abstentions are not regarded as voting, a negative vote from any of the five
permanent members can still block the Council's decision. During the
Cold War period, which emerged almost immediately after the birth of the
United Nations and did not end until recently, the lack of agreement
among members of the Security Council, particularly among its perma-
nent members, made it impossible for the Security Council to carry out its
functions fully in the manner originally contemplated under Chapter VII.
The U.N. Charter did not envisage peacekeeping. Rather, this con-
cept emerged out of necessity and became the only practical method
acceptable to the Council members for dealing with conflicts during the
Cold War period. Only recently has the Council been able to implement
decisions under Chapter VII authorizing Member States or ad hoc mul-
tinational forces to intervene with military force in emergency conflict
situations.
The first U.N. peacekeeping operation in 1948 in the Middle East
best illustrates the circumstances in which this instrument was created.5 In
1947, Palestine was a territory administered by the United Kingdom under
mandate from the League of Nations. It had a population of approxi-
mately two million, two-thirds of whom were Arabs and one-third of whom
were Jews. Both communities claimed control of the entire territory.
Unable to find a solution acceptable to both communities, the British Gov-
ernment presented the matter to the General Assembly in April 1947. The
Assembly adopted a partition plan in November, which divided the terri-
tory into an Arab State and ajewish State, with an international regime for
Jerusalem. The plan, however, was not acceptable to the Palestinian Arabs
or the Arab States, and violent fighting broke out in Palestine. When Jew-
ish leaders proclaimed the State of Israel, hostilities intensified. Eventu-
ally, the Security Council called for a cease-fire, which was accepted by
both parties. Although the superpowers saw the need to contain the fight-
ing, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to allow the
other to intervene. When it became evident that a third party was needed
to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire, the first U.N.
peacekeeping operation was created: the United Nations Truce Supervi-
sion Organization (UNTSO), a group of unarmed military observers.
Following the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, the United Nations
expanded the original functions of the military observers. Despite these
changes, UNTSO remained in the area in order to contain incidents and
prevent them from escalating into larger conflicts.
5. For an historical account of U.N. peacekeeping operations, see U.N. DEP'T OF
PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMETs: A RvIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING,
U.N. Doc. DPI/1065, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990).
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The second U.N. peacekeeping operation evolved in 1956 during the
Suez Crisis and continued until 1967. After Egypt decided to nationalize
the Suez Canal, heavy fighting broke out between the troops deployed by
France, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Egypt. A dangerous situation
developed, compelling the Security Council to assign an outside party, the
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), to the region. This force con-
sisted of lightly armed military personnel from neutral Member States. Its
tasks were to secure and supervise the withdrawal of the armed forces of
France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from the Egyptian territory and to
serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.
The UNTSO and UNEF missions were then followed by a series of
peacekeeping operations: India and Pakistan (1949); Lebanon (1958);
Yemen (1963); Dominican Republic (1965); Afghanistan and Pakistan
(1988); Iran and Iraq (1988); Angola (1989); Central America (1991);
Iraq and Kuwait (1991); and Tajikistan (1994). In each case, the underly-
ing circumstances required a neutral third party to contain a conflict by
supervising a cease-fire already in place and ensuring its continuity. A
U.N. peacekeeping operation fulfilled this third-party role.
Thus, traditional U.N. peacekeeping forces were composed of
unarmed military observers, lightly-armed peacekeeping forces, or a com-
bination of the two. The United Nations recently introduced civilian
police as a third component of these forces. In particular, the multi-
dimensional operations in Namibia and Cambodia illustrate the interac-
tion between all three components, including a large civilian contingent
to carry out political, humanitarian, and administrative functions.
The United Nations does not have its own military observers or forces.
Normally Member States provide personnel at the request of the Secre-
tary-General for the duration of the specific mission. They wear their own
national uniforms but with U.N. insignia. Until very recently, the United
Nations sought peacekeeping troops only from countries such as Argen-
tina, Bangladesh, Canada, India, Ghana, Nepal, Pakistan, and Scandinavia.
As a rule, the Secretary-General tries to include forces from countries
politically and geographically separated from the hostilities. This policy
has become more difficult to implement in recent years due to limited
availability of troops and the need for special training, equipment, and
technological capability. Often the Secretary-General has no choice but to
accept military personnel from one country and to provide training and
the necessary equipment from other countries. Since each mission is a
composite of different national contingents, the maintenance of a unified
command has been a major problem. The United Nations has often been
criticized for this inefficiency even though the causes are essentially
beyond its control.
U.N. peacekeeping operations do not include actions which are
authorized by the Security Council but carried out by interested Member
States or by an ad hoc multinational force. Examples of non-peacekeep-
ing operations include: the international force in Korea; Desert Storm,
conducted in Kuwait; Operation Uphold Democracy, by the multinational
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forces in Haiti; Operation Turquoise, by the French forces in Rwanda; and
the Russian force deployed in Georgia. These are authorized activities but
are not conducted by the United Nations. Responsibilities rest with the
participating States themselves.
The United Nations usually finances peacekeeping operations from
its regular budget. The expenses are apportioned according to a special
formula which charges the permanent members of the Security Council
and the industrialized countries more for peacekeeping than they nor-
mally pay under the regular budget. Thus, the permanent members of
the Security Council collectively bear 53.37% of the expenses, which is
higher than their shares under the regular budget (41.99%).6 The
expenses have increased from $340 million in 1988 to $3.6 billion in 1995.
Half of the amount often remains unpaid.
Since 1948, the United Nations has established a total of thirty-six
peacekeeping operations: thirteen in Africa, six in Asia and the Pacific,
ten in the Middle East, three in Europe, and four in Latin America (see
Appendix A). Half of these operations are still ongoing.
H. Characteristics of Peacekeeping Operations
Peacekeeping operations may be grouped into several categories. First,
there are the traditional types of missions which include: (I) the Disen-
gagement Observer Force (UNDOF), created in 1974 at the Syrian Golan
Heights; (2) the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), created in 1978 in
Southern Lebanon; (3) the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP), active since 1949 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and
(4) the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) created in 1991.
Most traditional operations were created before 1988. 7
The second category refers to multi-dimensional peacekeeping opera-
tions including: (1) the Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); (2)
the Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); (3) the Angola Verification
Mission HI (UNAVEM 1i); and (4) the Transitional Assistance Group
(UNTAG) in Namibia.
The Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) and the Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) belong to the third category, involving
operations in which the United Nations acts as an administrator for those
territories during a transitional period.
The fourth category consists of good offices missions such as the
Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and the
6. The industrialized countries also pay more for peacekeeping expenses than
their shares under the regular budget. Japan and Germany, for example, pay respec-
tively, 14.009% (13.95%) and 8.979% (8.94%). U.N. Doc. ST/ADM/SER.B/475
(1995). This document is issued periodically containing the status of financial contri-
butions of U.N. Member States.
7. Note, however, that some "traditional type" missions were established after
1988. One such example is the Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), established
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican
Republic (DOMREP).
The Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) 8 and the Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia belong to yet another group.
These forces operate in areas plagued by internal armed conflicts and are
frequently subject to attacks.
Traditional peacekeeping operations, which are normally manned by
armed or unarmed military and civilian personnel, are established with
the consent of the parties concerned. Their main purposes are to super-
vise or monitor the implementation of a cease-fire or troop withdrawal, or
to serve as a buffer between the opposing forces. Thus, for example,
UNTSO was created to supervise the implementation of an armistice
agreement, the Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established to
monitor the implementation of the disengagement of troops, and the Mili-
tary Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was set up to
observe and report on a cease-fire. Several operations, such as the
Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the Operation in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
(UNIKOM) were organized to verify compliance with an agreement. In
some operations, U.N. forces were inter-positioned between the warring
factions in order to create a buffer zone. The peacekeepers in UNEF I,
UNEF II, and the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) assumed this
role. Consent is essential for the presence in the mission area and for
exercising freedom of movement in that area. Consequently, if the con-
sent is withdrawn, as was the case with UNEF I in 1967, the United Nations
must withdraw its operations.
Setting up such a mission normally presupposes the existence of
either a de jure or defacto cease-fire or a peace arrangement endorsed by
the Security Council. The Council will first issue a mandate requesting the
Secretary-General to implement the operation. This process provides a
basis of legitimacy.
Although non-use of force is a basic principle governing traditional
peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers may resort to force in cases of self-
defense. Therefore, peacekeepers may use force to defend against armed
attacks or to resist any armed attempts to prevent the mission from dis-
charging its duties. Only the minimum force proportional to the attack
may be used. These principles are defined in the Rules of Engagement
which are issued by the Field Commander and approved by Headquarters.
Impartiality is another requirement of peacekeeping missions. In
order to preserve the confidence and cooperation of the parties and to
maintain the credibility of the mission, U.N. personnel must not take sides
in the conflict.
8. UNOSOM's mandate was terminated on March 31, 1995, pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 954. S.C. Res. 954, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3447th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/954 (1994).
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Some of the older missions varied from the traditional type. For
example, the Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was created to ensure the
withdrawal of Belgian forces and to assist the Congolese Government in
maintaining law and order. As the situation worsened, its tasks expanded
to include maintaining the territorial integrity and the political indepen-
dence of the Congo, preventing civil war, and securing removal from the
Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary, and advisory personnel.
Similarly, in 1962, the General Assembly authorized UNSF to main-
tain peace and security in West Irian under the U.N. Temporary Executive
Authority established by agreement between Indonesia and the Nether-
lands. Both of these operations went beyond the traditional scope of
peacekeeping operations as outlined above.
M. Changing Characteristics
The year 1989 marked the beginning of a new era in peacekeeping. Thir-
teen peacekeeping operations had been established between 1948 and
1987, while twenty-three additional operations have been established since
1988. More peacekeeping operations have been launched in the past four
years than over the course of the previous forty-five. More importantly,
the nature and concept of peacekeeping has also changed in order to
respond to different situations.
While some operations still fall within the traditional category, most
current missions deal with urgent problems in many regions of the world
including ethnic strife, civil wars, collapsing economics, natural disasters,
and failure of governance. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations
which dealt predominantly with conflicts between nations, post-1988
peacekeeping operations involve domestic disputes such as secessions, par-
titions, and inter-factional conflicts.
Recent peacekeeping operations have become multi-dimensional in
their functions. For example, in addition to monitoring cease-fires,
peacekeepers are now responsible for demobilizing military units, assisting
in elections, rebuilding infrastructure, temporarily taking over some of the
functions of a national government, training and monitoring national civil
police, and repatriating and rehabilitating both refugees and displaced
persons. The operations in Namibia (UNTAG), Cambodia (UNTAC), El
Salvador (ONUSAL), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ) are such examples.
Recent operations also involve the restoration of State sovereignty in
countries where the governmental authority has collapsed. Peacekeepers
are called upon to provide basic security, service, and administration to
the local population and at the same time to restore the capacity of the
State. In these instances, the Security Council authorizes the missions to
resort to force in carrying out their tasks. These developments give rise a
host of questions: Is there a consistent U.N. policy in this regard? Who is
making such a policy? Does the United Nations have the necessary mate-
rial, financial, logistical, and military means to perform those tasks? Does
the Organization have the full support of its Member States, particularly
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from those who are able to pay? Unless these questions are adequately
resolved, the U.N. peacekeeping role is unlikely to produce a long-lasting
effect.
Recent developments also include regional cooperation and preven-
tive deployment. A greater use of regional organizations has facilitated a
wide range of cooperative activities. The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) has decided to provide air support to UNPROFOR in con-
nection with its mandate in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations
has deployed joint field missions with the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and with the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) in Georgia. The United Nations and the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS) participated in ajoint operation within
the framework of the U.N. Mission in Haiti. The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has provided technical input on con-
stitutional issues relating to Abkhazia and the United Nations assisted
OSCE in the case of Nagorny Karabakh.
Should these cooperative activities with regional organizations be fur-
ther improved? If so, in what manner? Do these activities in any way point
to a shift of the prime responsibility in maintaining international peace
and security from the world organization to regional organizations? Per-
haps not. Nevertheless, appropriate methods should now be developed to
ensure a coherent development.
The creation of the first preventive deployment of a U.N. peacekeep-
ing force is symbolic of the changing role of U.N. missions in the 1990s. A
specific example is the presence of U.N. military, civilian, and administra-
tive personnel in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia along its
borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). The purpose of preventive deployment is to discourage
and prevent hostilities from breaking out in those areas.
Preventive deployment is a new but effective technique for conflict
prevention. It requires early detection of the emerging conflict and early
deployment in order to discourage hostilities. Since missions must be
deployed in the field, the intervening force must first obtain the consent
of at least one of the parties involved. Since preventive deployment can
only serve as a holding operation, the root of the dispute must be
addressed in order to resolve the situation.
There is an inseparable link between peacekeeping on the one hand
and peacemaking and peacebuilding on the other. Peacekeeping was
originally envisaged as a temporary operation. Therefore, it is only a
means and cannot be an end in and of itself. Operations in Namibia and
Cambodia testify to the need for multi-dimensional approaches and activi-
ties. An increasing number of situations now call for measures which go
beyond the traditional tasks of supervising a cease-fire or creating a buffer
zone. While traditional peacekeeping is important, it cannot succeed on
its own. It must be applied in concert with conflict prevention, peacemak-
ing, peace enforcement, and post-conflict re-building. The Secretary-Gen-
eral's Agenda for Peace and its Supplement is a good guide in this
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IV. Application of Humanitarian Law
Protection has become an important function of the more recent
peacekeeping operations. Operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia,
and Rwanda have been called upon to safeguard protected areas or to
protect humanitarian supplies and refugee relief. At the same time, they
must try to stabilize the situation and work with the concerned parties
towards a negotiated settlement. In some cases, the Security Council has
authorized U.N. forces to take "all necessary measures" to ensure the
implementation of their mandates.
The applicability of international humanitarian law to peacekeeping
operations has become very important in cases where casualties have
occurred and persons have been detained or arrested. Are the 1949
Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Protocols applicable in these cases? On
what basis? What are the legal issues involved?
U.N. peacekeeping operations certainly must observe humanitarian
rules in conducting their activities. However, two sets of problems are
involved. First, the United Nations is not and cannot be a party to the
existing humanitarian conventions which are open to States only.
Another problem is that existing legal instruments are intended for regu-
lating armed conflicts between States or within a State. The rights and
obligations are imposed only on States which are parties to them. Because
the United Nations is not a State, it does not have the competence neces-
sary to implement the obligations fully even if it were to be accepted as a
contracting party. For example, the United Nations could not appoint a
protecting power and does not possess the necessary competence to enact
penal laws for the punishment of persons who have committed grave
breaches. It is therefore not possible for the United Nations formally to
apply those legal instruments.
For the purpose of ensuring the observance of humanitarian rules,
the United Nations, the host country, and the countries contributing
troops must enter into a tripartite commitment. Each side is required to
observe the basic principles and spirit of existing humanitarian conven-
tions. These instruments include the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977
Geneva Protocols, and the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. In order to provide
uniform interpretation and application, the United Nations and the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross are preparing a list of the basic prin-
ciples to be observed. However, these guidelines may not be specific
enough for the soldiers on the ground. Since the goal is to provide a
uniform legal basis for all U.N. peacekeeping operations, more detailed
rules regarding arrests and detention are needed in order to ensure con-
formity with general human rights standards.
9. Botrraos Boun-os-GHAu, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE WITH THE NEW SUPPLEMENT
AND RELATED U.N. DocuMENTs (2d ed. 1995). U.N. Doc. DPI/1623/PKO (1995).
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Questions about the applicability of international humanitarian law to
U.N. peacekeeping operations are important, but should not be exagger-
ated. While there have been reported breaches by U.N. forces, the
number of instances is very limited. The Member States concerned have
intensified their efforts to ensure the observance of humanitarian law by
their troops acting on behalf of the United Nations.
We should not be distracted from the most important issue-how best
to ensure observance of humanitarian law by the parties in an armed con-
flict. International humanitarian law is still state-centered. The interna-
tional community imposes an obligation to observe humanitarian
instruments on parties to the Conventions, and they are responsible for
taking the necessary measures to ensure the implementation. The law
governs inter-State armed conflicts and conflicts within a State when Gov-
ernment forces are involved, but it generally does not apply to domestic
conflicts, While the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Pro-
tocols are nearly universally accepted, most current armed conflicts take
place in countries where the governments are either too weak to maintain
law and order or have totally lost control of the situation. Consequently,
international humanitarian law is rarely applied in current armed conflicts
taking place within nations. Thus, we face the challenge of how to impose
a legal obligation on combatants who are free from legal constraints.
The U.N. Security Council has established two war crimes tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. These courts are
intended for the prosecution and punishment of persons who have com-
mitted serious crimes (crimes against humanity, genocide, grave breaches,
etc.). Individual criminal responsibility is imposed on persons who have
committed such crimes.' 0 While these efforts are intended to deter the
commission of war crimes by the threat of severe punishment, the effect of
such deterrence remains to be seen. The critical issue remains how to
make the law applicable to the actual combatants who are in the midst of
an armed conflict.
10. For background and the legal basis that led to the creation of the Yugoslav
Tribunal, see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Reso-
lution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). For information on the Rwvanda
Tribunal, see S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994). The Statute of the Tribunal is annexed to the resolution.
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Appendix A
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"
AnucA ACRONYm LOCATION CHARACrER DURATION
* 1. United Nations
Operation in the
Congo
* 2. UN Transitional
Assistance Group
* 3. UN Angola Verifica-
tion Mission I
* 4. UN Angola Verifica-
tion Mission 1I
5. UN Mission for the
Referendum in
Western Sahara
* 6. UN Operation in
Somalia I
* 7. UN Operation in
Mozambique
* 8. UN Operation in
Somalia II
* 9. UN Observer Mis-
sion in Uganda and
Rwanda
10. UN Observer Mis-
sion in Liberia
11. UN Assistance Mis-
son in Rwanda
*12. UN Aouzou Strip
Observer Group
13. UN Angola Verifica-
tion Mission III
MIDDLE EASr
14. UN Truce Supervi-
sion Organization
*15. UN Emergency
Force
*16. UN Observation
Group in Lebanon
*17. UN Yemen Observa-
tion Mission
18. UN Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus
*19. UN Emergency
Force II
20. UN Disengagement
Observer Force
21. UN Interim Force in
Lebanon
*22. UN Iran-Iraq vfili-
tary Observer
Group
23. UN Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mis-
sion
ASIA/PACIFIC
24. UN Military
Observer Group in
India and Pakistan
*25. UN Security Force
in West New
Guinea
*26. UN India-Pakistan
Observation Mis-
sion
ONUC Congo
UNTAG
UNAVEM I
UNAVEM II
MINURSO
UNOSOM I
ONUMOZ
UNOSOM II
UNOMUR
UNOMIL
UNAMIR
UNASOG
UNAVEM III
UNTSO
UNEF I
UNOGIL
UNYOM
UNFICYP
UNEF II
UNDOF
UNIFIL
UNIIMOG
Namibia
Angola
Angola
Western Sahara
Somalia
Mozambique
Somalia
Uganda/
Rwanda
Liberia
Rwanda
Aouzou Strip,
Chad
Angola
Jerusalem
Suez
Lebanon
Yemen
Nicosia
Suez
Damascus
Naquora,
Lebanon
Iran/Iraq
Military opera-
tion
Multi-dimension
Verification
Verification
Referendum
Relief
Multi-dimension
Protection &
Relief
Observation
Observation
Assistance
Observation
Multi-dimension
Buffer
Buffer
Observation
Observation
Buffer
Buffer
Observation
Observation
Observation
June 58-Dec. 58
Apr. 89-Mar. 90
Jan. 89-June 91
June 91-Feb. 95
Sept. 91-Present
Apr. 92-Apr. 93
Dec. 92-Dec. 94
May 93-Mar. 95
June 93-Sept. 94
Sept. 93-present
Oct. 93-present
May 94-June 94
Feb. 95-present
June 48-present
Nov. 56-Jun. 67
June 58-Dec. 58
July 63-Sept. 64
Mar. 64-present
Oct. 73-July 79
June 74-present
Mar. 78-present
Aug. 88-Mar. 90
UNIKOM UMM Qasr Observation Apr. 91-present
UNMOGIP Rawalpindi/ Observation Jan. 49-present
Srinagar
UNSF West New Administration Oct. 62-Apr. 64
Guinea (West
Irian)
UNIPOM India/Pakistan Observation Sept. 65-Mar. 66
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*27. UN Good Offices UNGOMAP Afghanistan/
Mission in Afghani- Pakistan
stan and Pakistan
*28. UN Advance Mission UNAMIC Phnom Penh
in Cambodia
*29. UN Transitional UNTAG Phnom Penh
Authority in Cam-
bodia
EUROPE
30. UN Protection Force
31. UN Observer Mis-
sion in Georgia
32. UN Mission of
Observers in
Tajikistan
LATIN AMERICA
*33. Mission of the Rep-
resentative of the
SG in the Domini-
can Republic
*34. UN Observer Group
in Central America
35. UN Observer Mis-
sion in El Salvador
36. UN Mission in Haiti
UNPROFOR
UNOMIG
UNMOT
DOMREP
ONUCA
ONUSAL
UNMIH
Zagreb, Croatia
Sykhumi,
Georgia
Dushanbe,
Tajikistan
Dominican
Republic
Five countries
San Salvador
Port-au-Prince,
Haiti
Good Offices Apr. 88-Mar. 90
Fact-finding Oct. 91-Mar. 92
Administration Mar. 92-Sept. 93
Protection &
Relief
Observation
Observation
Mar. 92-present
Aug. 93-present
Dec. 94-present
Good Offices May 65-Oct. 66*
Multi-dimension
Multi-dimension
Multi-dimension
Nov. 89-Jan. 92*
July 91-present
Sept. 93-present
* Terminated
"This chart, which was prepared by the author's assistant, Mrs. H. Pajardo, classifies U.N.
peacekeeping missions on a geographical basis. It is based on information contained in THE BLUE
HEMErs, supra note 5.

